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WASHINGTON'S ZONING VESTED RIGHTS
DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
The zoning doctrine of vested rights' enables the holder of, or applicant
for, a building permit to complete a proposed land development despite a
subsequently effective zoning change barring that development. 2 Under
Washington's minority3 view of the doctrine, a vested right to develop
land accrues when a party makes a timely and complete building permit
application that complies with the applicable zoning and building
ordinances in effect on the date of the application. 4 The traditional
justification for the Washington rule is that it provides a "date certain" -
the date of application-on which the right to develop land vests. 5 In
contrast, the majority of jurisdictions follow a vested rights rule of zoning
estoppel; a vested right to develop land accrues only when a developer
substantially changes position in reliance on a building permit application
prior to the legislative change of the zoning ordinance.
6
The Washington vested rights doctrine evolved in the context of
Euclidean zoning. 7 In the past two decades, however, planned unit
1. This comment is solely concerned with the vested rights doctrine as applied to zoning. Histori-
cally, vested rights analysis was used to determine the validity of retroactive civil legislation, al-
though it has generally declined in importance in modem retroactivity law. Hochman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutionality, of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692, 696 (1960).
Washington courts, however, still use vested rights analysis to determine the validity of retroactive
civil legislation. Pape v. Department of Labor & Indus., 43 Wn. 2d 736, 264 P.2d 241 (1954). For a
further analysis of the vested rights concept see note 11 infra.
2. The doctrine enables the building permit holder or applicant to obtain a vested right to develop
land in accordance with the zoning ordinance in effect at the time the application is made. Mere
application, or even permit issuance, does not automatically vest the right to develop; other require-
ments of the doctrine must still be met. Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the
LandDevelopment Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 625-26 (1978).
3. The minority doctrine is followed in four other states: Georgia, Gifford-Hill Co., Inc. v. Har-
rison, 229 Ga. 260, 191 S.E.2d 85 (1972); Idaho, Ready-to-Pour, Inc. v. McCoy, 95 Idaho 510,
511 P.2d 792 (1973); Indiana, Knutson v. State, 239 Ind. 666, 160 N.E.2d 200 (1959); and Ohio,
Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960). The Florida cases are split; some
support the minority view. See, e.g., Aiken v. E.B. Davis, Inc., 106 Fla. 675, 143 So. 658 (1932).
The positions taken by American jurisdictions are listed in Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 596 (1973).
4. See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
5. Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn. 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (1958). See also text accompanying
notes 46-47 infra.
6. See note 14 infra.
7. This name comes from the leading Supreme Court zoning case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclidean zoning is characterized by a reliance on the individual
lot as the basic regulatory unit. Size and placement of structures on the lots are controlled by mini-
mum setback from the street requirements and structure size to lot area ratios. Overall development
density is constrained by minimum lot size regulations. A second hallmark of Euclidean zoning is a
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development (PUD) zoning schemes have introduced greater flexibility to
land development regulation. PUD zoning differs substantially from the
Euclidean model, which segregates various land uses into different zones.
Under a PUD scheme, developments are larger in scope and are
characterized by variations in the intensity of land use. 8 In Mercer
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Bremerton,9 the Washington Supreme Court
applied the vested rights doctrine to a large scale, multistage PUD
project. The court held that Mercer's right to develop had vested even
though its building permit application for the first phase of the
development was incomplete, and complied with the prior zoning
ordinance only if it was considered in light of the entire development.' 0
The court's analysis, however, failed to acknowledge the shift in zoning
from a Euclidean to a PUD context, and the impacts of that shift on the
vested rights doctrine.
Part I of this comment reviews the judicial analysis underlying the
Washington doctrine, and outlines the elements and scope of the vesting
rule. Part II analyzes the Mercer decision and questions whether that
decision promotes the purposes of the Washington doctrine in the PUD
zoning context. This comment contends that the Mercer court's rule for
vesting rights to develop land on the basis of incomplete building permit
applications fails to consider important public policy interests. In
conclusion, Part III proposes a modified vesting rule that addresses the
problems inherent in the Mercer decision.
strict separation of land uses into different zones such as classifying one area as single-family residen-
tial and another as commercial. Note. Adninistrative Discretion in Zoning. 82 HARV. L. REV. 668.
669-71 (1969).
8. "Planned unit development" means an area of land, controlled by a landowner. to be devel-
oped as a single entity for a number of dwelling units, and commercial and industrial uses, if
any, the plan for which does not correspond in lot size, bulk, or type of dwelling or commercial
or industrial use, density, lot coverage and required open space to the regulations established in
any one or more districts created, from time to time, under the provisions of a municipal zoning
ordinance enacted pursuant to the conventional zoning enabling act of the state.
D. HAGMAN. URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 431 (1971) (quoting U.S.
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, ACIR STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
31-36-00, at 5 (cum. supp. 1970)).
PUD zoning is designed to preserve flexibility in the design, arrangement, and mix of housing and
other land uses. Unlike Euclidean zoning, it is not "self-administering," that is. development approv-
als are not automatically issued once compliance to the zoning ordinance has been demonstrated.
Instead, the PUD zoning ordinance is general; the details of each proposed development are then
reviewed by the local zoning authority. The goal of the review is to assure that the development is
adequately "'matched" to the site and the needs of the community. Normally, the process requires the
exercise of administrative discretion by the local zoning authority. See Krasnowiecki. Legal Aspects
of Planned Unit Development in Theory and Practice, in FRONTIERS OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT:
A SYNTHESIS OF EXPERT OPINION 99, 100-02 (R. Burchell, ed. 1973).
9. 93 Wn. 2d 624, 611 P.2d 1237 (1980).
10. Id. at 626, 631, 611 P.2d at 1239, 1241.
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I. THE PRESENT DOCTRINE
A. Vested Rights: Two Approaches
The term "vested rights" sums up a judicial determination that the
property interests of a party have become sufficiently fixed so that it is
inequitable to divest them through the retroactive application of
subsequent legislation. 1 The purpose of a zoning vested rights doctrine is
to establish the point in the land development permit process after which
the right to develop land 12 is judicially protected from legislative
termination by rezoning. 13
Under the majority rule of zoning estoppel, the right to develop land
vests when a party substantially changes its position in reliance upon an
act or omission of the government in the permit process. 14 In the absence
of a developer's change of position, a later change in the zoning
ordinance that bars the proposed use revokes a building permit or
11. The term "vested rights" has little meaning as an independent concept, because it is the.prod-
uct of circular reasoning. Retroactive civil legislation is said not to affect rights that are vested, but
courts usually define vested rights as rights which "may not be interfered with by retrospective laws."
American States Water Serv. Co. v. Johnson, 31 Cal. App. 2d 606, 88 P.2d 770, 774 (1939). Conse-
quently, commentators reject vested rights as a concept. See, e.g., Hochman, supra note 1, at 696.
The better view is to regard the term "vested rights" as a conclusory description of a right or interest
that is sufficiently secure so that it is unfair or a violation of due process to take it away. Cunningham
& Kremer, supra note 2, at 662.
12. The Washington Supreme Court has held that "[a]lthough less than a fee interest, develop-
ment rights are beyond question a valuable right in property." Louthan v. King County, 94 Wn. 2d
422, 428, 617 P.2d 977, 981 (1980). The concept of the right to develop as an interest inherent in
land ownership is not new. Historically, such rights have been thought of as coming up from the land
itself. W. REiLLY, THE UsE OF LAND 140 (1973). Until the end of the 19th century, the right to
develop was restricted only by nuisance considerations. In the 20th century, however, the scope of
the right has been further reduced by zoning, building, land use, and environmental regulations. At
present, the right to develop may be conceived of as a property interest derived from land ownership,
but exercise of the right is conditioned upon compliance with socially-imposed regulations. Cunning-
ham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 630-33.
13. Comment, Vested Rights to Develop Land: California's Avco Decision and Legislative Re-
sponses, 6 EcOLoGy L.Q. 755, 756 (1978).
14. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested
Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 63. Heeter has stated the majority rule as follows:
A local government exercising its zoning powers will be estopped when a property owner,
(1) relying in good faith,
(2) upon some act or omission of the government,
(3) has made such a substantial change in position or incurred such extensive obligations and
expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights which he ostensibly
had acquired.
Id. at 66.
The elements necessary to establish a zoning estoppel vary from state to state. See Annot., 50
A.L.R.3d 596 (1973).
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application. 15 Thus, vesting of the right to develop land under the zoning
estoppel rule depends largely upon the acts of the parties in the permit
process.
In Washington, the vested rights doctrine is based upon the courts'
view of the land development permit process as being fundamentally
ministerial, because all discretionary policy issues have been previously
decided by the legislative body creating the zoning regime. 16 Under this
view, if a developer submits a complete building permit application that
complies with the applicable zoning and building ordinances, then the
local government lacks discretionary authority to deny the requested
permit. Instead, it has a ministerial duty to issue the permit. 17 The
existence of the duty to issue the permit gives rise to a corresponding right
in the developer to compel permit issuance by writ of mandamus. 18 Once
this right comes into existence, the developer also possesses a vested right
to develop land, which cannot be terminated by a retrospective
application of a subsequently effective change in the zoning ordinance. ' 9
15. See Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn. 2d 125, 129, 331 P.2d 856, 858 (1958) (restating and rejecting the
majority rule).
16. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wn. 2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954).
17. Id. In Ogden, the plaintiff sought to build a produce market. His application for a building
permit was denied because the site lacked suitable parking. Plaintiff purchased adjacent land for a
parking lot and resubmitted the building permit application. It was rejected on the ground that park-
ing, although permitted by the ordinance, was not the highest use of the property. Plaintiff then
brought an action for a writ of mandamus to compel building permit issuance. The city responded by
rezoning the property agricultural. The supreme court held that Ogden had a vested right to develop:
A property owner has a vested right to use his property under the terms of the zoning ordi-
nance applicable thereto. A building or use permit must issue as a matter of right upon compli-
ance with the ordinance. The discretion permissible in zoning matters is that which is exercised
in adopting the zone classifications with the terms, standards, and requirements pertinent
thereto, all of which must be by general ordinance applicable to all persons alike. The acts of
administering a zoning ordinance do not go back to the questions of policy and discretion which
were settled at the time of the adoption of the ordinance. Administrative authorities are properly
concerned with questions of compliance with the ordinance, not with its wisdom. To subject
individuals to questions of policy in administrative matters would be unconstitutional. Art. I. §
12, of the constitution of the state of Washington, provides:
"'No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than
municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens, or corporations."
Id. at 495. 275 P.2d at 901-02 (citations omitted).
18. State ex rel. Craven v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wn. 2d 23, 26-28, 385 P.2d 372. 374-76
(1963).
19. Id. at 27, 385 P.2d at 375. In Craven, the supreme court held that the City of Tacoma could
not refuse to issue a building permit to the owner of a lot in an illegally platted subdivision. The city's
denial of a permit was not permissible because it had, according to the court, a ministerial duty to
issue the building permit once the lot owner submitted a building permit application that complied
with the zoning and building ordinances. Once these ordinances had been complied with. the court
stated it could see the "ready application" of State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wn. 2d 492.
275 P.2d 899 (1954). In other words, when the zoning and building ordinances had been complied
with, the lot owner had a vested right to develop.
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The Washington doctrine thus equates the vested right to develop land
with the developer's right to compel permit issuance. 20
B. The Elements of the Washington Vested Rights Rule
To vest the right to develop land under the Washington doctrine, a
party must meet the following three-part test:
A right to develop land vests if the applicant files a building permit appli-
cation that:
(1) Complies with the existing zoning ordinance and building code
(Compliance);
(2) Is filed during the effective period of the ordinance under which the
applicant seeks to develop (Timeliness); and
(3) Is sufficiently complete (Completeness). 21
1. Compliance
The primary purpose of the compliance requirement is to protect the
integrity of the land development permit process. 22 Therefore, the
compliance test is objectively and strictly applied. 23 A noncomplying per-
mit or application is void and cannot vest the right to develop land. 24 The
source and nature of the defect is irrelevant. The source of noncompliance
may be the developer, the local government, or their mutual mistake. 25
20. The Washington rule appears to be based on the notion of land development as a right. See
note 12 supra. A right to develop exists because a building permit must be issued at the time the
zoning and building applications are complied with. The supreme court, in Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn. 2d
125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958), selected the time of permit application as the time at which the right to
develop in accordance with the then existing zoning vests. The right to develop and the right to a
building permit thus accrue at the same time.
In zoning estoppel jurisdictions, the emphasis is placed on the conduct of the parties leading to an
estoppel, rather than on the building permit. The building permit is essentially a revocable license in
these jurisdictions. See, e.g., Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 205 Cal. 426, 434, 271 P. 487,
490-91 (1928).
21. This statement of the rule is the author's synthesis of the cases cited in notes 24-35 infra.
22. In Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973),
which involved a building permit that was issued even though it did not comply with Seattle's build-
ing code, the supreme court stated: "We cannot find that a litigant has any right to be a beneficiary of
unlawful administrative conduct where the public interest will suffer, by the mere assertion that ex-
tensive financial investment is in the balance." Id. at 484, 513 P.2d at 43.
23. Id. at484-86, 513 P.2dat42-43.
24. Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn. 2d 402, 341 P.2d 499 (1959); Nolan v.
Blackwell, 123 Wash. 504, 212 P. 1048 (1923).
25. See Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 483-84, 513 P.2d
36,42 (1973). See also Lewis v. City of Medina, 87 Wn. 2d 19,548 P.2d 1093 (1976) (permit issued
under mutual mistake of facts held void); Nolan v. Blackwell, 123 Wash. 504, 212 P. 1048 (1923)
(city officials erroneously issued unlawful building permit; permit held void).
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The nature of the defect may be substantive or procedural. A permit or
application is substantively defective if it fails to propose a permitted land
use under the applicable zoning ordinance. 26 A permit or application is
procedurally defective if it is processed or issued contrary to local ordi-
nances.27
2. Timeliness
The timeliness requirement determines the applicability of the vested
rights doctrine. If a building permit application is filed after a rezone has
taken effect, no vested rights claim may be raised, and the property is
subject to the new zoning ordinance. 28 To be timely, a building permit
application must be tendered to the local government during the effective
period of the ordinance under which the developer seeks to build.
29
3. Completeness
To serve as the basis of a vested rights claim, a building permit applica-
tion must be sufficiently complete before the effective date of the zoning
26. City of Mercer Island v. Kaltenbach. 60 Wn. 2d 105, 106-07, 371 P.2d 1009. 1010-11
(1962). In Kaltenbach, the city of Mercer Island brought suit to enjoin defendants from operating a
commercial art "conservatory" in a residential district. Defendants contended that they had a vested
right to the commercial use because their prior building permit authorized a "residence and private
conservatory," and they had been assured by city officials that an art school would be within the terms
of that permit. The court held that defendants had no vested rights, since a commercial use had never
been permitted by any of the prior zoning ordinances, and estoppel could not serve as the basis for a
vested rights claim. The court said: "The ultimate question is whether the use is authorized by the
ordinance, and this must be determined as a matter of law by the courts and not by informal opinions
of county administrative officials." Id. at 107, 371 P.2d at 1011. See also Lewis v. City of Medina.
87 Wn. 2d 19, 548 P.2d 1093 (1976); Pierce v. King County, 62 Wn. 2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963)
(holding that no vested right can be based on an invalid spot zone in a prior ordinance).
27. A test for a procedurally defective permit or permit application may be derived from Eastlake
Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973). In Roanoke, a de-
veloper based its vested rights claim upon a building permit conditionally issued subject to a "struc-
tural and ordinance check." Id. at 479-80, 513 P.2d at 41. The supreme court held the permit invalid
and rejected the vested rights claim. The court identified two procedural defects. First, the permit was
issued contrary to a specific building code requirement that plans be checked prior to building permit
issuance. Id. at 481-82, 513 P.2d at 41. Second, the building code did not authorize issuing condi-
tional permits. Id. Thus, under the Roanoke analysis, a permit or application is defective if the issu-
ing procedure is: ( I) contrary to specific local ordinance requirements; or (2) an extraordinary proce-
dure not authorized by local ordinance.
28. Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wn. App. 709. 558 P.2d 821
(1977) (septic tank permits).
29. The ordinance under which the applicant seeks to develop must be in effect when the appli-
cant applies for a building permit. If the permit application precedes the effective date of that ordi-
nance or is made after the ordinance has been repealed, no vested right under the desired ordinance
may be claimed. State ex rel. Kuphal v. City of Bremerton, 59 Wn. 2d 825, 371 P.2d 37 (1962).
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change. Filing a complete permit application is the operative act that con-
verts the developer's mere expectation of no zoning change into the
vested right to develop, despite a subsequently effective zoning change.
30
The completeness requirement has two purposes. First, the application
must be at least sufficiently complete to enable a court to determine
whether the building permit application complies with the zoning and
building ordinances. 31 Second, the completeness requirement substitutes
for a judicial determination that the developer has proceeded in good
faith. 32 The rationale is that the difficulty and expense of completing a
permit application justifies a presumption that the developer actually in-
tends to build, and is not merely speculating to obtain more valuable land
with established development rights. 33
In Parkridge v. City of Seattle,34 the supreme court created a limited
exception to the completeness requirement. In Parkridge, the issue was
whether a right to develop land could vest despite an incomplete building
permit application when the developer's diligent attempts to complete the
application prior to the zoning change had been obstructed by the local
government. 35 The court held that the development right had vested, not-
withstanding the incompleteness of the application, because the de-
veloper's good faith conduct merited recognition of the vested right. 36
The Parkridge decision indicates some judicial willingness. to weigh the
acts of the parties in the permit process when determining whether the
right to develop has vested but only for the completeness element of the
vesting rule.
30. Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn. 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (1958):
[T]he right vests when the party, property owner or not, applies for his building permit, if that
permit is thereafter issued. This rule, of course, assumes that the permit applied for and granted
be consistent with the zoning ordinances and building codes in force at the time of the applica-
tion for the permit.
See also Mayer Built Homes, Inc. v. City of Steilacoom, 17 Wn. App. 558, 564 P.2d 1170, review
denied, 89 Wn. 2d 1009 (1977). In Mayer, the court held that it is the filing of the permit application
that vests the right to develop. Id. at 565, 564 P.2d at 1174. However, as Hull makes clear, the
application must be such that a permit can be issued on it; in other words, it must be complete. 53
Wn. 2d at 130, 331 P.2d at 859.
31. Mercer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Bremerton, 93 Wn. 2d 624, 633-34, 611 P.2d 1237,
1242-43 (1980) (Utter, C.J., dissenting).
32. Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn. 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (1958).
33. Id.
34. 89 Wn. 2d 454,573 P.2d 359(1978).
35. Parkridge was a consolidation of two separate actions: (I) a challenge to the substantive
validity of a rezone; and (2) a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of a building permit on a vested
rights theory. The supreme court referred to these as the "rezone case" and the "vested rights case."
Id. at 456, 573 P.2d at 361. The "rezone case" is discussed in Note, Rezones: New Standards for
Governing Bodies, 55 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1979). Unless otherwise noted, all references to Park-
ridge in this comment concern the "vested rights case."
36. 89 Wn. 2d at 464-66,573 P.2d at 365-66.
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C. The Scope of the Vested Rights Doctrine
The vested rights doctrine applies to other land development permits,
such as shorelines, 37 grading, 38 and septic tank 39 permits. These permit
processes, like the building permit process, are generally viewed as min-
isterial functions. It is unclear whether the doctrine applies to discretion-
ary development permit processes, such as conditional use permit and
variance approvals. 4 0 Since the doctrine is based on a ministerial permit
theory, however, it should not be possible to obtain vested rights prior to
a developer's acquisition of all necessary discretionary approvals.
4 1
A vested right to develop land, once acquired, is not absolute. The
doctrine only protects the developer from legislative changes of the zon-
ing ordinance. For example, the doctrine does not prevent denial of a
building permit based on adverse environmental consequences under the
State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) for two reasons. First, permit
denials based on environmental grounds are discretionary, not ministe-
rial, acts of a local government. Second, SEPA-based permit denials are
37. The Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1979), requires that
development permits be issued before construction can occur on Washington's shorelines. Id. § 90.-
58.140(2). The vested rights doctrine applies to such permits. Talbot v. Gray. II Wn. App. 807. 525
P.2d 801 (1974), review denied, 85 Wn. 2d 1001 (1975).
38. Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 83, 510 P.2d
1140, 1155, review denied. 83 Wn. 2d 1002 (1973).
39. Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wn. App. 709. 558 P.2d 821
(1977).
40. Conditional uses and variances are defined in the Washington Planning Enabling Act. WASH.
REV. CODE ch. 36.70 (1979). A conditional use is defined as:
[A] use listed among those classified in any given zone but permitted to locate only after review
by the board of adjustment, or zoning adjustor if there be such, and the granting of a conditional
use permit imposing such performance standards as will make the use compatible with other
permitted uses in the same vicinity and zone and assure against imposing excessive demands
upon public utilities, provided the county ordinances specify the standards and criteria that shall
be applied.
Id. § 36.70.020(7). A variance is defined as:
[T]he means by which an adjustment is made in the application of the specific regulations of a
zoning ordinance to a particular piece of property, which property, because of special circum-
stances applicable to it, is deprived of privileges commonly enjoyed by other properties in the
same vicinity and zone and which adjustment remedies disparity in privileges.
Id. § 36.70.020(14).
41. One Washington case has stated in a dictum that the vested rights doctrine applies to the
issuance of special (conditional) use permits. Beach v. Board of Adjustment. 73 Wn. 2d 343, 347.
438 P.2d 617. 620 (1968). To the extent that Beach may be read as support for the proposition that a
vested right may be obtained prior to a necessary exercise of administrative discretion, the dictum is
unsound. The Washington vested rights doctrine is premised on the absence of administrative discre-
tion in the issuance of land development permits. State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wn. 2d
492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954). The vested right to develop exists upon application for a building permit
because the local government at that time comes under a non-discretionary duty to issue the requested
permit. State ex rel. Craven v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wn. 2d 23, 385 P.2d 372 (1963). If discretionary
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not zoning actions; rather, they are based on state law which overlays the
building permit process. The zoning vested rights doctrine therefore does
not apply.
42
Vested rights to develop land may also be terminated by legislation
enacted to protect public health or safety which has the effect of prohibit-
ing a proposed development. 43 So long as the legislation is reasonably
necessary, substantially related to suppressing a danger, and does not un-
reasonably discriminate, "[t]here is no such thing as an inherent or vested
right to imperil the health or impair the safety of the community."
44
D. Rationale: Date Certain Vesting
The primary rationale for the Washington vested rights doctrine is cer-
tainty as to the date of vesting. 45 The certainty rationale may be viewed
from two perspectives: it benefits (1) judicial decision-making; and (2)
rational land development investment decisions.
authority to approve or deny the requested permit exists, there is no enforceable duty to issue the
permit. A court will not, by writ of mandamus, compel the performance of a discretionary act in a
specified manner. It will only require that the discretion be exercised, and a reasoned decision made.
Peterson v. Department of Ecology, 92 Wn. 2d 306, 596 P.2d 285 (1979). Therefore, the vested
rights doctrine should not apply. This conclusion is supported by the supeme court's decision in Jones
v. Town of Woodway, 70 Wn. 2d 977, 425 P.2d 904 (1967). In Jones, the court held that the vested
rights doctrine did not apply to granting plat approvals, because the town council possessed dis-
cretionary authority to approve or reject proposed plats.
The rule on discretionary development approvals and permits should be that no vested right to
develop can accrue until the developer has obtained the last discretionary approval necessary prior to
issuance of the penultimate building permit. The need to preserve administrative discretion is particu-
larly important in the PUD area. PUD zoning, unlike Euclidean zoning, makes use of administrative
discretion to assure that developments approved have the optimum density and mix of uses appropri-
ate to the particular site. Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81, 87-88
(1968). See also note 8 supra.
42. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wn. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978). See also Cook v.
Clallam County, 27 Wn. App. 410, 618 P.2d 1030 (1980).
43. Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wn. 2d 929,481 P.2d 9 (1971).
44. Id. at 931, 481 P.2d at 11 (quoting City of Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 471, 82 P.
747,748 (1905)).
45. In Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn. 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (1958), the court stated:
Notwithstanding the weight of authority, we prefer to have a date certain upon which the right
vests to construct in accordance with the building permit. We prefer not to adopt a rule which
forces the court to search through... "the moves and countermoves of... parties... by way
of passing ordinances and bringing actions for injunctions"-to which may be added the stalling
or acceleration of administrative action in the issuance of permits-to find that date upon which
the substantial change of position is made which finally vests the right. The more practical rule
to administer, we feel, is that the right vests when the party, property owner or not, applies for
his building permit.
The Hull court also concluded that the cost of securing building permits justified a presumption that
developers would not speculate in the enhanced values of land for which building permits had been
hurriedly obtained prior to a zoning change. Id.
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The rule of vesting the right to develop land on the date of application
is easy to apply. The Washington doctrine creates a mechanical stan-
dard-building permit application compliance, timeliness, and complete-
ness. This standard makes it unnecessary for a court to undertake a case-
by-case inquiry into the fundamental vested rights issue of whether it is
fair 46 to divest a party of property expectations through retroactively ap-
plying a subsequently effective zoning ordinance. By applying the me-
chanical rule in deciding a case, a court can avoid the difficult inquiry.
Rather, it may simply decide on which side of the bright line a dev-
eloper's permit application falls.
The doctrine's more persuasive social policy justification is that it fos-
ters rational land development investment decisions by providing for rela-
tively early and certain vesting of the right to develop land. 47 In Washing-
ton, the development right is secure from later zoning changes once a
timely, conforming, and complete building permit application is filed.
48
Under the zoning estoppel rule, however, the vested fight to develop land
is not established until the developer has substantially changed position in
reliance on its building permit or application. 49 Establishing a substantial
change of position normally requires that the developer initiate or expand
capital investment in the land development project by actual construction
or site work prior to the legislative zoning change. 50 Since the circum-
stances that establish sufficient reliance vary from case to case, the de-
veloper is never certain it has "relied enough." 5 1 From the investment
46. See note II supra.
47. For the purposes of this comment, an early vesting rule is defined as a rule that permits
vesting of the right to develop land (I) prior to actual issuance of the building permit: and (2) without
requiring a substantial change of position by the developer.
48. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
49. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
50. In California. the leading majority-rule jurisdiction, a developer must demonstrate a substan-
tial change of position by initiating actual construction in reliance upon a duly issued building permit
to obtain a vested right to develop. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional
Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976). In Avco, the developer's vested
rights claim was denied because the building permits had not yet been issued even though the de-
veloper had relied on preliminary grading permits by initiating subdivision developments, such as
installation of streets and sewers, and had spent over $3,000,000.
51. Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 122
Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). Developer Aries was held to have no vested right to complete construction of a
$2,000,000 condominium project even though it had secured all necessary permits. The Aries court
refused to consider the developer's $353,000 expenditure incurred prior to receiving the final dis-
cretionary government approval of the project as action taken in reliance on the government. A later
$28,000 expenditure undertaken after the developer received all the necessary permits was labeled
"'insubstantial" and "merely preparatory " Id. at 550-5I, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27. For further dis-
cussion of the reliance requirements of the zoning estoppel rule, see Cunningham & Kremer. supra
note 2, at 669-96; and Heeter, supra note 14. For a critical analysis of the zoning estoppel rule.
particularly in California, see Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights of Fetal Development vis a vis
the Abortions of Public Whimisy, 7 ENVT'L L. 519 (1977).
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decision standpoint, vesting under the zoning estoppel rule is both late
and uncertain. 
52
A late and uncertain vesting rule imposes two types of social costs: risk
costs and demoralization costs. 53 Risk costs are the direct costs that a de-
veloper incurs if it is unable to complete the proposed land develop-
ment. 54 Examples include the loss of capital expenditures for planning,
design, site work, and initial construction. Risk costs are social losses
because, once incurred, they are nonrecoverable and do not add to the
total social welfare. 55 Demoralization costs are indirect costs that result
from the chilling effects of uncertainty upon investment expectations.
56 If
the ability to complete land developments is uncertain, then fewer inves-
tors and developers will seek to enter the market, thereby reducing pro-
duction. Thus, demoralization costs can be thought of as the present cap-
italized dollar value of lost future production.
57
The zoning estoppel rule exaggerates both risk and demoralization
costs. Risk costs expand because a developer cannot establish sufficient
reliance to obtain the vested right until actual construction begins. 58 At
52. Hagman, supra note 51.
53. Id. at 527-38. The concept of risk and demoralization costs employed by Professor Hagman
is derived from the work of Professor Michelman. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1214-24 (1967).
54. Hagman, supra note 51, at 534. Risk costs are a subset of what Michelman labels demoral-
ization costs. By Michelman's analysis, what Hagman calls risk costs can be quantified as the dollar
value necessary to offset the disutilities incurred by the developer as a "loser" when the vested rights
claim is not recognized. Michelman, supra note 53, at 1214.
55. Hagman, supra note 51, at 527. When a partially completed land development is stopped,
the investment up to that point is wasted. In addition, there is a further elfficiency loss, since the
graded, partially developed land has a reduced environmental value, and, in fact, further investment
is necessary to restore the land.
An example of the risk costs in one project, the Roanoke Reefs Condominium, is found in Eastlake
Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973), where the
developers were found to have no vested rights even though they had spent over $2,000,000. Subse-
quently, the developers sued the city of Seattle in Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 607, 547
P.2d 1221 (1976), for its negligence in issuing an invalid building permit. The supreme court upheld
a damage award of $2,896,534. Of that amount, $2,362,554 was invested prior to terminating the
project. Brief for Appellant at 52, Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 607, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976).
56. Hagman, supra note 5 1, at 527-29. As Hagman suggests, a vested rights doctrine should not
be concerned with the gains and losses from speculations in the value of unimproved land since these
losses are not social costs. Hagman is instead concerned with a vested rights doctrine that, in his
view, deters the construction of adequate housing supplies at reasonable prices.
Quantification of risk and demoralization costs is presently unavailable. However, the magnitude of
the problem may be indicated by one commentator's estimate that changes in land development stan-
dards and expansion of permit requirements added between $1,000 and $3,000 to the cost of a house
in 1976. Priest, Foreword to F. BOSSELMAN, D. FEURER & C. SIMON, THE PERMrr EXPLOSION at v
(1976).
57. Michelman, supra note 53, at 1214.
58. See note 50 supra.
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this late stage in the development permit process, capital investment at
risk is substantial. Demoralization costs are high because even this heavy
investment yields little certainty that recognition of a vested right to de-
velop land will enable completion of the project. 59 Both of these costs are
borne by consumers of developed land. Developers must include risk
costs in their price structures since they can avoid risk only by not devel-
oping at all. As market entry is deterred by uncertainty, supply declines.
Assuming constant demand, prices may be expected to rise to reflect rela-
tive scarcity. 60
Utilitarian economic factors are but one aspect of the social value of a
rule of law. Nonetheless, the Washington vesting doctrine offers substan-
tial advantages over the rule of zoning estoppel. The early vesting deci-
sion reduces risk costs since capital investment need not be expanded to
establish the vested right. The certainty the rule fosters may reduce, at
least in part, demoralization costs.
II. THE DOCTRINE IN CONFUSION: ANALYSIS OF
MERCER ENTERPRISES, INC. V. CITY OF BREMERTON
A. The Mercer Case
1. The Facts
Plaintiff-developer Mercer Enterprises, Inc. applied on September 3,
1976 for a building permit to construct Phase I of a projected 443-unit
housing development on forty-nine acres zoned R-1 in the City of Brem-
erton. 61 Under Bremerton Ordinance 3210, the R-1 zoning class allowed
a maximum density of 9.075 units per acre in a PUD-type scheme. 62 The
building permit application was for only the 196 multi-family units on
12.31 acres in Phase I, but was accompanied by a site plan proposal, as
required under the ordinance, showing 408 multi-family units on 30.81
acres and thirty-five single family units on 18.5 acres. 63 Overall project
59. See notes 50-51 supra.
60. See Hagman, supra note 51, at 534.
61. Mercer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Bremerton, 93 Wn. 2d 624, 625, 611 P.2d 1237, 1239
(1980).
62. Bremerton, Wash., Ordinance 3210 (Mar. 5, 1975) (repealed 1977). The ordinance is not
labeled a PUD ordinance. However, the Kitsap County Superior Court construed Ordinance 3210 as
a PUD ordinance in Holly Homes, Inc. v. City of Bremerton, No. 69553 (Kitsap County Super. Ct.
Oct. 30, 1979) (oral decision of Bryan, J.).
63. Ordinance 3210 requires a developer to submit a site plan to the city planning department
when applying for a building permit in R-I districts. The site plan binds the property to the form of
development exhibited on the plan unless both the planning department and the city council agree to
modifications. Mercer, 93 Wn. 2d at 628, 611 P.2d at 1240.
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density approximated nine units per acre, but the Phase I density ex-
ceeded fifteen units per acre. 64 The site plan was submitted to the Bremer-
ton Planning Department for approval. 65
The Bremerton Building Department took no action on the permit
pending planning department approval of the site plan. At times during
the process, Mercer received informal assurances from city officials that
it was proceeding correctly to obtain its permits, and it continued to nego-
tiate with the city regarding its proposal. However, responding to neigh-
borhood group pressures, the city council placed a moratorium on R-1
zone permit processing on December 8, 1976. On December 15, 1976,
Mercer was notified that its Phase I building permit application was in-
complete. Mercer submitted further information, but its application re-
mained substantially incomplete when Ordinance 3210 was repealed in
March, 1977.
Mercer filed suit, seeking both a declaratory judgment that its right to
develop had vested and a writ of mandamus to compel the city to process
the permit application under the old zoning ordinance. The trial court
found for Mercer and issned the writ. The supreme court affirmed in a
five-four decision.
66
2. Issues and Holding
The Mercer case presented two issues: first, whether a building permit
application's compliance with the applicable zoning ordinance is deter-
mined solely on the basis of information supplied in the application or is
determined with reference to the entire development proposal when the
building permit is sought as a part of a larger planned unit development; 67
second, whether administrative delays in the permit process constitute
sufficient official obstruction of a developer's attempts to complete the
building permit application so that vested rights may be acquired despite
application incompleteness. 68
The Mercer majority decided that Mercer's application, including the
site plan, should be considered as a whole for the purpose of determining
64. Chief Justice Utter's dissenting opinion gives the Phase I density as 11.78 units per acre. Id.
at 634, 611 P.2d at 1242. However, 196 units divided by the 12.31 acres in Phase I yields a density of
15.922 units per acre. Chief Justice Utter's density figure may reflect all the anticipated multi-family
portions of the project.
65. Id. at628,611P.2dat 1240.
66. Id. at 628-631, 611 P.2d at 1240-41. See also note 83 infra.
67. See note 68 infra.
68. 93 Wn. 2d at 626, 630, 611 P.2d at 1239, 1241. The majority opinion lumps both issues
together and states the issue as the "sufficiency" of the permit application.
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its compliance with the density restrictions of Ordinance 3210.69 The
court found that the city had considered Mercer's proposal as a single unit
and that Mercer had relied on the city's unitary treatment in the permit
process. Since the parties viewed the project as a whole, the court found
that Mercer's compliance with the zoning ordinance should be evaluated
on the same basis. 70 If the site plan and the building permit application
are considered as a whole, Mercer's application complied with Ordinance
321 O's density requirement of less than nine units per acre.
The majority also found that administration delay obstructed the de-
veloper's attempts to complete the building permit application.7' The court
reasoned that the delay in approving the site plan proposal, which in turn
delayed the processing of the building permit, obstructed Mercer's at-
tempts to complete the permit application.7 2 The court therefore applied
the diligence-obstruction rule of Parkridge v. City of Seattle73 and held
that Mercer's fight to develop had vested.
74
B. Analysis of Mercer
1. Determining Compliance
In Mercer, the court soundly concluded that compliance of individual
building permit applications for segments of larger, multi-stage PUD
projects should be determined with reference to the total project as a unit.
That conclusion both conforms to the purposes of the compliance element
of the vesting rule and is appropriate for PUD development.
Determining compliance on the basis of the total development proposal
is consistent with the purpose of the compliance requirement of the vest-
ing rule: protecting the integrity of the development permit process.
75
69. Id. at 628, 611 P.2d at 1240.
70. Id. Chief Justice Utter, dissenting, concluded that the permit application's compliance with
the zoning ordinance should be measured solely on the basis of the permit application. Id. at 633. 611
P.2d at 1242-43. This comment takes the position that Chief Justice Utter's dissent confuses the
questions of the existence of the vested right and the scope of the right obtained. The issue of the
existence of a vested right should be resolved on the basis of the total project as one unit. See notes
76-81 and accompanying text infra. The scope of the right is a separate question; the view taken here
is that the scope issue should be resolved by reference to the building permit application. See notes
109-10 and accompanying text infra.
71. 93 Wn. 2d at 630-31,611 P.2d at 1241. The dissent claimed that the application was incom-
plete for failure to submit information required by the city building code as required under the permit
process. The trial court found that Mercer did not submit "storm and sewer plans, plumbing and
electrical plans, foundation investigations, and water service plans necessary before issuance of a
final permit." Id. at 635, 611 P.2d at 1243.
72. Id.
73. 89 Wn. 2d 454,573 P.2d 359(1978).
74. 93 Wn. 2d at 631,611P.2d at 1241.
75. See note 22supra.
Vol. 57:139, 1981
Zoning Vested Rights
First, the site plan and building permit application, taken together, pro-
vide the local government and the courts with adequate information to
determine whether the permit application substantively complies-pro-
poses a permitted use-to the applicable zoning ordinance. 76 Second, de-
termining compliance on the basis of the total plan is not a defective pro-
cedure. 77 As the Mercer court noted, determining compliance of the
permit application on this basis was not contrary to the express require-
ments of the Bremerton zoning or building code. The choice of this pro-
cedure was also consistent with the requirements of Ordinance 3210 that
site plans be approved prior to issuing a building permit. 7
8
Determining compliance of building permit applications with reference
to the total development proposal is functionally necessary in a PUD sys-
tem. 79 The PUD regime is designed to increase the flexibility of land
development. 80 Its principal techniques, cluster development and the
mixing of uses, vary the intensity of land use within the project. 81 If por-
tions of the proposed development are examined individually, they may
not comply with the terms of the zoning ordinance; yet the overall project
may comply. If a court applying the vested rights rule examined only
discrete project segments, then developers would be unable to obtain a
vested right to develop land unless they sacrificed some of the diversity
and flexibility of land development that PUD systems were designed to
achieve.
2. Completeness
The Mercer decision significantly expands the Parkridge exception82
to the completeness requirement of the vesting rule. Although the Mercer
court purports to simply apply the Parkridge rule, the cases are distin-
76. In Mercer the site plan provided the court with adequate information to determine whether
Mercer's proposal complied with Ordinance 3210's density requirements. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the supreme court independently, though implicitly, construed Ordinance 3210 as permit-
ting clustering of the units and substitution of privately held lots for common open spaces in calculat-
ing project density. 93 Wn. 2d at 628, 611 P.2d at 1240. See also note 106 infra.
77. See note 27 supra.
78. Mercer, 93 Wn. 2d at 630, 611 P.2d at 1241. In Mercer, the court confronted a situation in
which no city ordinance specified the procedures to be used in processing PUD applications under
Ordinance 3210. Therefore, the court applied a rule of reason, allowing developers to rely to some
extent on the assurances of city officials as to the proper procedures to follow. The majority distin-
guished City of Mercer Island v. Kaltenbach, 60 Wn. 2d 105, 371 P.2d 1009 (1962) (facts stated in
note 26 supra). Presumably, assurances by city officials as to substantive provisions of the zoning
code still provide no basis for a vested rights claim.
79. See note 8 supra.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
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guishable in two ways. First, the permit application was significantly less
complete in Mercer than in Parkridge.83 Second, in Parkridge, city offi-
cials acted in bad faith by imposing additional information requirements
for permit issuance on the developer to obstruct completing the permit
application and to halt the development. 84 In Mercer, however, there are
few indications of municipal bad faith. The delays in permit processing
stemmed from genuine, good faith difficulty in interpreting and applying
Ordinance 3210 to Mercer's unconventional development proposal.
85
The element of bad faith obstruction in the Parkridge diligence-obstruc-
tion test is largely absent in Mercer.
In reality, Mercer establishes a new exception to the completeness
rule, based on the conduct of the parties. Under Mercer an incomplete
permit application is sufficient to establish a vested right to develop land
if (1) the developer has sought to complete its permit application, but (2)
has been frustrated in its efforts by some governmental act or omission.
This rule is unsound. It does not reach the fundamental vested rights is-
sue, 86 nor does it provide an adequate test for deciding that issue.
Under the Washington vested rights doctrine, which the Mercer court
purports to retain, the filing of a complete permit application does more
than establish a presumption of developer good faith. It is also the opera-
tive act that converts the developer's mere expectation of no zoning
change into the vested right to develop despite a subsequently effective
zoning change barring the development. 87 When a developer fails to com-
plete its permit application, it has done less than the rule requires to estab-
83. In Parkridge, the developer submitted complete schematic drawings of the proposed struc-
ture, then revised the drawings, reducing the number of proposed units, after discussion with city
officials. The revised drawings were ready to be submitted when the city canceled the building permit
application. At that time, detailed structural plans also had been prepared. and a requested environ-
mental assessment was far advanced. 89 Wn. 2d at 465-66, 573 P.2d at 366.
The Mercer application was less complete. Since a much larger project was involved, storm.
sewer, plumbing, water service, and electrical plans were necessary for the permit to be issued. As
Chief Justice Utter pointed out in dissent, Bremerton officials could not have legally issued the re-
quested permits on the basis of Mercer's application. Despite being put on notice that further submis-
sions would be necessary, Mercer did not supply the requested information. 93 Wn. 2d at 635-36.
611 P.2d at 1244.
84. The supreme court admonished the Seattle officials in Parkridge, stating:
The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 and the other statutes and ordinances adminis-
tered by the building department serve legitimate functions, none of which is intended for use by
a governmental agency to block the construction of projects, merely because they are unpopular.
We make this statement in light of the history of this matter and because the building permit
application will be before the building department for further processing.
89 Wn. 2d at 466, 573 P.2d at 366.
85. In Mercer, the trial court found as a fact that the city acted in good faith. Finding of Fact XX.
Mercer Enterprises, Inc. v. Bremerton, No. 69384 (Kitsap County Super. Ct. May 26. 1978).
86. See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
87. See note 30 supra.
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lish a vested right.88 The developer stands in a lesser position because it
has no clear right to compel issuance of a building permit;89 the developer
cannot therefore claim the protection of the vesting rule. Viewed in this
fashion, the issue is not whether considerations of developer diligence or
official obstruction can excuse the failure to complete the permit applica-
tion. The fundmental issue is whether principles of fairness 90 still require
recognition of a vested right to develop despite the permit application's
incompleteness.91
The Mercer court's conduct test is inadequate to decide this fairness
issue for two reasons. First, the conduct test does not consider all the
relevant interests in the determination. Second, the conduct test therefore
cannot balance the countervailing interests at stake.
The elements necessary to a fair decision in the vested rights context
may be derived from the related "retroactivity of civil legislation" 92 doc-
trine. In the absence of specific constitutional provisions, 93 retroactivity
88. "[M]ore than the filing of an application for a building permit was required ... to protect the
applicant from a subsequent zoning change." Parkridge, 89 Wn. 2d at 465,573 P.2d at 366.
89. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
90. "Fairness" is not being used in the Rawlsian sense of the term. Rawls' principles of justice as
fairness are primarily applicable to evaluations of the basic structure of society. J. RAwLS, A THEORY
OF JUSnCE 60-61 (1971).
It is this comment's position that a particularized decision is more likely to be fair if all the relevant
interests in the matter are considered by the decision-maker.
91. If the application is complete, under the mechanical Washington rule, the right to develop is
vested. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. The supreme court recognized in Parkridge and
Mercer that, under exceptional circumstances, a vested right can accrue despite a failure to complete
the building permit application. The only tenable rationale for creating this exception is that doing so
is fair. That is also, as most commentators recognize, the basic reason for doctrines providing protec-
tion from retroactive civil legislation, whether labeled as "vested rights" or "retroactivity." See note
I Isupra.
92. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 660, provides a useful capsule description of basic
"retroactivity of civil legislation" doctrine:
Official acts of a legislative body will become effective at some defined moment or period.
The traditional pattern is to adopt legislation that is prospective in nature, therefore affecting
only those transactions or events occurring after passage of the statute. In contrast, retroactive
... legislation gives new legal significance to events or transactions that preceded enactment of
the legislation; very often the result is that actions that were legal when begun, and which al-
ready may be completed, are suddenly rendered illegal.
For several centuries the common law courts have therefore generally accepted the proposi-
tion that legislation that has such a retroactive effect is unfair and perhaps unconstitutional. The
general premise has been that legislation must by its nature be prospective in effect, reflecting a
general philosophy that statutory law should provide forewarning or guidance in order that peo-
ple may be able to plan their conduct with reasonable certainty of its legal consequences.
93. The United States Constitution prohibits states from passing ex post facto criminal laws,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), and laws impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10. The contract clause does not restrict the exercise of
legislative power for general and legitimate public welfare purposes. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S.
473,480 (1905).
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doctrine historically employed a vested rights analysis. 94 More recent de-
cisions, however, analyze a variety of public and private interest factors
to decide whether fairness and justice principles would be offended by
retrospectively applying subsequently enacted legislation. 95 These factors
may be reduced to two broad considerations: first, the weight and validity
of the private interests that would be impaired by a retrospective applica-
tion of the new law; second, the legitimacy and importance of the public
policy asserted by the new law. These competing considerations are then
balanced.96
The Mercer conduct test neither measures the competing interests, nor
balances them.97 The conduct test's criteria-developer diligence and of-
ficial obstruction-reflect only the developer's interest. 98 The test, how-
ever, does not adequately measure the developer's interest, since it does
not evaluate the extent to which the developer will be injured by the appli-
cation of the newly enacted zoning ordinance.
More significantly, the conduct test does not provide for any judicial
consideration of the competing public policy interests99 identified in and
implemented by the subsequently enacted ordinance. Zoning laws are a
94. See Hochman, supra note 1, at 696-97. See also Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retro-
active Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 540, 561-66 (1956). Washington still uses the vested
rights concept, see Godfrey v. State, 84 Wn. 2d 959, 963, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975), supplemented
by a rule of construction against retroactive application of statutes, Sorenson v. Western Hotels. Inc..
55 Wn. 2d 625, 349 P.2d 232 (1960).
95. Hochman, supra note 1, at 726-27.
96. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2. at 664-66. See also In re Marriage of Bouquet. 16
Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976). In Bouquet, the California Supreme Court
broke the two basic considerations down into six factors:
(1) The significance of the state interest served by the new law;
(2) The importance of retroactive application to effectuate the attainment of that interest:
(3) The extent of reliance on the prior law;
(4) Legitimacy of that reliance;
(5) The extent of actions taken on the basis of that reliance;
(6) The extent to which the retroactive application of the new law would disrupt actions taken
in reliance on the prior law.
Id. at 592, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
97. See notes 82-86 and accompanying text supra.
98. A developer may be diligent in seeking to complete its building permit application. but it
does not necessarily follow that the developer has significantly changed positions in reliance on its
application or the prior zoning ordinance. Mercer is an example.
99. For a zoning ordinance to be valid at all, it must serve the public health, safety, or welfare.
The various public purposes which zoning may promote are detailed in I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING 2d §§ 7.04-.33 (1976).
One comment has listed some costs associated with recognizing a vested right to develop land
which has been subsequently downzoned. These are:
(1) Unanticipated increases in public service costs:
(2) Increased automobile traffic;
(3) Intensified air and noise pollution;
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valid exercise of the police power intended to further public welfare. 100
Although retrospectively applying such legislation was historically disfa-
vored, courts now recognize that if retrospective application achieves the
legislative goal and furthers an important public policy, it is permissi-
ble. 101 Zoning vested rights cases involving incomplete permit applica-
tions may fall within this class. 102 Vesting rights on the basis of incom-
plete permit applications can impair both the legislative policy identified
in the new zoning ordinance, 103 and the judicial policy against encourag-
ing nonconforming uses. 104
These public policy interests are not dispositive. Nonetheless, the ab-
sence of consideration of public policy interests in the Mercer conduct
test makes it nearly impossible for a court to undertake the balancing
needed to determine whether a vested right to develop land should be
recognized to secure a fair result.
The Mercer completeness rule is also poor vested rights policy. The
rule provides for very early and easy vesting of the right to develop. This
has two effects. First, under a very early vesting principle, the courts tend
to supplant the local government's institutional role as the initial zoning
decision-maker. 10 5 Second, the ability of local governments to respond to
changed community needs by rezoning is unduly restricted, since the re-
zoning is likely to be ineffective against the very development which re-
(4) Violation of location, size, and architectural requirements set forth in pending zoning
comprehensive plans and ordinances;
(5) Reduction of open space;
(6) Aesthetic eyesores.
Comment, Vested Rights and Land Use Development, 54 OR. L. REv. 103, 109 (1975) (author's
paraphrase). Obviously, some of these costs are costs of development as well as costs of recognizing
vested rights.
100. Lewis v. City of Medina, 87 Wn. 2d 19,548 P.2d 1093 (1976).
101. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 664.
102. See notes 103-04 and accompanying text infra.
103. The newly enacted zoning ordinance may reflect a significant change in the policies guiding
community growth, as, for example, when it implements changes in the comprehensive plan. The
comprehensive plan is used in Washington to guide legislative and administrative zoning decision-
making. State ex rel. Standard Mining Co. v. City of Auburn, 82 Wn. 2d 321,510 P.2d 647 (1973).
104. Keller v. City of Bellingham, 92 Wn. 2d 726, 730, 600 P.2d 1276, 1279 (1979). No vested
right can be claimed to expand or reinstate a nonconforming use. State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wn.
2d 216, 222, 242 P.2d 505, 509 (1952).
105. The power to zone is delegated to local governments. WASH. CONsT. art. XI, § 1 I; WASH.
REv. CODE chs. 35A.63, 36.70 (1979). Too early vesting of the right to develop limits the ability of
local governments to make zoning decisions, because the initial filing of the building permit applica-
tion would foreclose any further government action as to the use of that property. In other words, by
recognizing a vested right the court in effect makes the decision to approve development. For a criti-
cal analysis of the Washington courts' activism in zoning matters, see Alkire, Washington's Super-
Zoning Commission, 14 GONZ. L. REv. 559 (1979).
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vealed the local zoning scheme as inadequate. 106 As a consequence, com-
munities will bear increased costs from nonconforming uses. 107 These
costs will be particularly burdensome when the proposed land develop-
ment is large scale, such as the PUD project involved in Mercer.
10 8
Large-scale development not only affects a community; it may also trans-
form it.
III. A MODIFIED VESTED RIGHTS RULE
A. The Proposed Rule
The vested rights rule should be modified to resolve vested rights con-
troversies arising in the context of large-scale PUD development as well
as traditional Euclidean zoning, as follows.
The right to develop land vests if the applicant files a building permit
application that:
(1) Complies with the existing zoning ordinance and building code as
determined by reference to the entire development proposal;
(2) Is filed during the effective period of the zoning ordinance under
which the applicant seeks to develop;
(3) Is complete prior to the effective date of the zoning change. If the
106. Mercer is a case in point. The City of Bremerton apparently intended the R-I classification
to encompass medium density cluster development. 93 Wn. 2d at 629, 611 P.2d at 1240 (quoting
letter from the Bremerton Planning Director to plaintiff Mercer). Mercer's application, however.
proposed high density multi-family units: the high density development was to be balanced by large.
single-family waterfront lots. Thus, Mercer intended to "comply" with Ordinance 3210 without pro-
viding any significant open space at all. One of the purposes for which Ordinance 3210 was passed
was to provide "more common open space within the RESIDENTIAL ONE DISTRICTS of the City.-
Bremerton, Wash., Ordinance 3210 (Mar. 5. 1975) (repealed 1977) (emphasis added). Plaintiff Mer-
cer's good faith in the matter is somewhat questionable; the city's efforts to block the development by
amending the ordinance appear understandable under the circumstances.
A prohibiting legislative response to a particular land development does raise fears of special legis-
lation, even under the facts in Mercer. Special legislation is arbitrary action against a particular per-
son or group. There is no need, however, to automatically invalidate retroactive legislation that is
aimed at a particular land development project:
To ignore that the public and their legislative representatives often become aware of a land use
problem only when a particular proposal suddenly brings into focus the shortcomings of the
existing regulatory scheme would deny human experience .... Thus. a particular project could
appear to be the focus of a new law, which would render that law suspect as special legislation.
However, merely because the project spurred legislative awareness which resulted in the change
of policy should not render the law unenforceable as applied to the project. Newly awakened
public concerns are no less legitimate than others and, in the absence of a showing of intentional
discrimination, should be equally deserving of retroactive application when they represent im-
portant public policies.
Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 668-69. See also Hochman, supra note I, at 701-02.
107. See note 99 supra.
108. 93Wn. 2d at 628, 611 P.2d at 1240.
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application is not then complete, a vested right to develop may be recog-
nized only if the developer's interest outweighs the legitimate public policy
interests identified in the subsequently enacted zoning ordinance.
B. Analysis
1. Compliance
The Mercer court held that the compliance of a large-scale, multiple-
phase PUD project with the zoning ordinance should be determined on
the basis of the entire development, and not its discrete components. The
modified rule follows the court's holding on this issue.
The court did not resolve the associated question of whether the scope
of the vested right the developer acquires encompasses the entire develop-
ment proposal. 109 The modified rule would not expand the scope of the
right beyond what is applied for in the building permit. 110
2. Completeness
Securing development permits for large-scale PUD projects remains an
expensive, time-consuming process. Cases like Parkridge and Mercer,
involving incomplete applications, are likely to recur. The Washington
courts should retain the rule that the right to develop vests on filing of a
complete and conforming building permit application. The courts should
also, however, develop a consistent rule for dealing with incomplete-per-
mit-application cases.
Section (3) of the modified rule suggests that in deciding vested rights
cases involving incomplete applications, the courts should balance the in-
terests of the developer and the local government, and determine whether
recognizing a vested right is necessary to be fair to the developer under
109. Both the majority and dissenting opinions are confusing on this point. The writers both
appear to confuse, or at least subsume, the issues of existence of the right and scope of the right. See
note 81 supra. The precise remedy ordered by the trial court and affirmed by the supreme court is of
no help; it requires only that the city, under a writ of mandamus, process Mercer's building permit
application. Conclusion of Law VI, Mercer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Bremerton, No. 69384 (Kit-
sap County Super. Ct. May 26, 1978) (emphasis added). That application, of course, covered only
Phase I of the project. Mercer itself conceded that it would have to file new building permit applica-
tions for remaining phases of the project. 93 Wn. 2d at 634, 611 P.2d at 1243 (Utter, C.J., dissent-
ing).
If Mercer is read to support the notion that the scope of the vested right extends to all future phases
of a multi-phase project, the case would represent a sharp departure from existing law, since vested
rights could be obtained prior to filing a building permit application. It is unlikely that the court would
overrule such substantial prior law by such a very indirect implication.
110. See notes 29-30 & 109 supra.
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the circumstances of the case. III In applying this balancing rule, the
courts must, however, accurately identify the interests at stake.
a. The Developer's Interest
The developer's interest in completing the proposed land development
should be both legitimate and substantial to merit recognizing a vested
right. The developer's interest is legitimate if the developer has, in good
faith, made a complying and timely application that is diligently pur-
sued. 112 Applications filed with notice of pending zoning changes should
not be regarded as made in good faith. 
113
The weight to be attached to the developer's interest will vary from
case to case. A court can evaluate the weight of the interest by looking to
the investment the developer has placed at risk 14 in terms of expenditures
to secure permits and approvals, costs of preliminary site preparations,
and nonvoidable contract obligations incurred. 115 A court should also
111. The balancing test suggested here is based on the modem retroactivity of civil legislation
doctrine. See notes 91-96 and accompanying text supra. It also reflects one aspect of the Washington
decisional law with respect to equitable estoppel against governments. An estoppel, under Washing-
ton law, will not be raised against a government when doing so would substantially impair the exer-
cise of sovereign governmental powers. Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wn. 2d 161. 169-70. 443 P.2d 833.
839 (1968). See also Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of Health. 16 Wn. App. 709.
716, 558 P.2d 821, 826-27 (1977) (rejecting alternative equitable estoppel claim in vested rights
case because of "overriding considerations of public health"). Finch and Ford may be cited for the
proposition that courts must consider public interests before invalidating governmental actions on
grounds of fairness.
112. This factor is similar to the court's analysis in Mercer. See text following note 85 supra.
This comment does not take the position that the actions of the developer and the government in a
vested rights case are irrelevant: rather, it suggests that those actions should not be the sole basis on
which cases like Mercer should be decided.
113. When a permit application is made following notice of a pending zoning change. there is no
legitimate reliance on the prior ordinance. Although reasonable expectations of continuity in the law
may be frustrated, those expectations are not a sufficient reason to apply the vested rights doctrine.
Godfrey v. State, 84 Wn. 2d 959. 962-63, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975).
114. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra. Consideration of such costs is not the functional
equivalent of adopting the zoning estoppel rule in Washington. First, the extent of the developer's
reliance is not the sole basis for decision under the proposed rule. Second, the balancing test applies
only to incomplete applications: manufacturing reliance by expending very large sums would be diffi-
cult because construction of the project cannot proceed until the building permit is obtained.
115. Losses in land values that result from a downzone should not be considered. Such losses are
not social costs because of the "shifting value" theory. The value of land for development is largely a
function of its location. If a change in zoning restricts the ability to develop in one location, the value
of similar lands in other locations will be enhanced. Thus, a downzone does not destroy value mea-
sured on a societal basis: it merely shifts it. Professor Hagman argues that such shifts do not impose
heavy demoralization costs, because "losing a bet only temporarily demoralizes a gambler. ...
[E]ven if demoralization costs are so high that people stop investing in land, it may not make much
difference because land is not human made. . . . It is not very important to encourage investment in
raw land as a matter of efficiency. That is not so with respect to buildings. It is important that inves-
tors continue to invest in shelter if we are to have it." Hagman. supra note 51, at 528-29.
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consider how far the development permit process has advanced prior to
the zoning change. A developer who has secured preliminary permits and
approvals should stand in a stronger position than a developer who has
merely submitted a speculative proposal. 116
b. The Public Policy Interest
In evaluating the weight and legitimacy of the public policy interest
identified in the subsequently enacted zoning ordinance, a court should
consider three factors.
(1) The legitimacy of the policy interest identified in the subsequently
enacted ordinance
A court must necessarily review the legitimacy of the interest identified
in the rezone in order to assure that substantial land development interests
are not terminated for impermissible reasons. The test to be applied is
whether the policy articulated in the rezone bears a substantial relation-
ship to the general public welfare. 117 Although courts should be sensitive
to allegations of special legislation, the rezone should not be per se in-
valid for the purpose of vested rights cases if the record reveals that the
rezone occurred in response to the proposed land development. 118
(2) The importance of the zoning change relative to the overall
community zoning regime
Clearly, some zoning policy interests are likely to be more significant
than others. For example, a rezone of hundreds of acres from industrial to
residential use in accordance with comprehensive plan changes should
have greater weight than does an amendment deleting five possible uses
from the fifty permitted in a classification district." 9 The importance of
116. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 666. This criterion is relevant in two ways.
First, if a developer obtains almost all of the preliminary permits, those actions intuitively suggest a
greater reliance on the prior zoning ordinance. Second, the more conditions that are satisfied (assum-
ing that one views the right to develop as a conditional right as is suggested in note 12 supra) the
stronger the claim of right.
117. This test states present Washington law with respect to the substantive validity of a rezone.
Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wn. 2d 454, 460, 573 P.2d 359, 364 (1978) (rezone case). See also
Note, Rezones: New Standards for Governing Bodies, 55 WASH. L. REV. 255, 258-59 (1979). As
this note explains, the Washington courts distinguish between "quasi-adjudicatory," "administra-
tive" rezones, typically downzones of small parcels, and "legislative" rezolies of a more general
nature. The quasi-adjudicatory rezone is not aided by a presumption of validity, and must, to be
valid, bear a substantial relationship to the public welfare and be supported by adequate evidence. Id.
at 264-66.
118. See note 106supra.
119. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 666-67.
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any particular type of change is relative, however, and should be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.
(3) The necessity of retroactive application to effectuate attainment of
the policy interest
Having determined that the policy interest is significant and legitimate,
a court should balance the impact of recognizing a vested right allowing
the proposed development against the ability to achieve the policy inter-
est. When completing the development would substantially frustrate the
intended zoning change, the case for rejecting the vested rights claim is
strengthened. 120
IV. CONCLUSION
The vested rights doctrine should balance the competing policy goals
of eliminating wasteful risk and uncertainty in the land development per-
mit process and retaining sufficient local government flexibility to re-
spond to changed community conditions by rezoning. The present Wash-
ington doctrine of vesting the right to develop when the building permit
application is conforming, timely, and complete adequately protects both
these goals.
The vested rights doctrine must now accommodate large-scale, multi-
ple-phase planned developments as well as traditional Euclidean land de-
velopments. In Mercer, the supreme court adopted a reasonable rule of
referring to the entire development proposal to determine whether build-
ing permit applications comply with the zoning ordinance. This rule al-
lows a rational application of the doctrine to PUD developments and
should be retained.
The Mercer decision also justifiably recognizes the need to grant vested
rights prior to completing the building permit application in exceptional
cases. The court's analysis of the conduct of the parties in the building
permitting process does not, however, provide a sound basis for decision.
Instead, the court should balance the developer's interest in completing
the proposed development against the public policy interests identified in
the subsequently enacted zoning ordinance. A balancing approach, en-
compassing all the relevant interests, provides a better means of securing
a fair result.
Fredrick D. Huebner
120. Id. at 667. Factors (2) and (3) are linked, as the commentators suggest. Two types of devel-
opments would be likely to significantly frustrate the legislatively defined policy: (1) large scale de-
velopment; and (2) development with significant spillover and nuisance characteristics.
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